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Netzer: Florida Constitutional Law: Demise of Common Law Distinction Betw

FLORIDA CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: DEMISE OF THE
COMMON LAW DISTINCTION BETWEEN
TESTAMENTARY AND PROPERTY RIGHTS*
Shriners Hospitalfor Crippled Children v. Zrillic, 563 So. 2d 64 (Fla.

1990)
Respondent, pursuant to section 732.803 of the Florida Statutes,12
requested an order to avoid a charitable devise in her mother's will.
*Dedicated to my parents Berton and Barbara Netzer for giving me the gift of tenacity,
and to my wife, Linda, for sharing my dreams.
1. FLA. STAT. § 732.803 (1985). This section is known as Florida's mortmain statute.
Shriners Hosp. for Crippled Children v. Zrillic, 563 So. 2d 64, 65 n.1 (1990). This section provides:
(1) If a testator dies leaving lineal descendants or a spouse and his will devises
part or all of the testator's estate:
(a) To a benevolent, charitable, educational, literary, scientific, religious, or
missionary institution, corporation, association, or purpose,
Cb) To this state, any other state or country, or a county, city, or town in this
or any other state or country, or
(c) To a person in trust for any such purpose or beneficiary, whether or not
the trust appears on the face of the instrument making the devise,
the devise shall be avoided in its entirety if one or more of the lineal descendants
or a spouse who would receive any interest in the devise, if avoided, files written
notice to this effect in the administration proceeding within 4 months after the
date letters are issued, unless:
(d) The will was duly executed at least 6 months before the testator's death, or
(e) The testator made a valid charitable devise in substantially the same amount
for the same purpose or to the same beneficiary, or to a person in trust for the
same purpose or beneficiary, as was made in the last will or by a will or a series
of wills duly executed immediately next to the last will, one of which was executed
more than 6 months before the testator's death.
(2) The testator's making of a codicil that does not substantially change a charitable
devise as herein defined within the 6-month period before the testator's death shall
not render the charitable gift voidable under this section.
FLA. STAT. § 732.803 (1985).
2. Zrillic, 563 So. 2d at 65. Respondent's mother, Lorraine E. Romans, a resident of
Florida, executed her Last Will and Testament on May 5, 1986. Id. She died on July 19, 1986.
Id. The testator's will provides, in relevant part:
ELEVENTH: All the rest residue and remainder of my estate, of whatever
nature and wherever situated of which I may be siezed [sic] or possessed or to
which I may be entitled at the time of my death, including lapsed legacies and
any property over which I have a power of appointment I give, devise and bequeath
as a charitable donation to the SHRINERS HOSPITAL[S] for CRIPPLED CHILDREN ....
Id.
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Section 732.803 provides that a testator's spouse or lineal descendant
may avoid a charitable devise 3 if the testator executed the will less
than six months before the testator's death. 4 In response to this request, petitioners 5 asserLed two affirmative defenses. First, petitioners
6
alleged that respondent lacked standing to avoid the charitable devise.
Second, petitioners asserted that section 732.803 was an unconstitu-

tional violation of the equal protection provisions of the United States
7

and Florida Constitutions.
Although the trial court found that respondent had standing, s it
ruled that section 732.803 was unconstitutional. 9 The Florida Fifth
District Court of Appeal reversed and held the statute constitutional. 10
The appellate court determined that the statute was rationally related
to its purpose of protecting spouses and lineal descendants from disinheritance due to ill-considered charitable devises.11 The statute

achieved this purpose by distinguishing between testators who considered a charitable devise at least six months before their death and
those who acted with less reflection.12 Upon review, 13 the Florida
Supreme Court quashed the district court's decision,' 4 and HELD,
section 732.803 unreasonably and unnecessarily regulated constitution-

3. Charitable devises include those made to corporations, associations, or institutions with
educational, religious, literary, scientific, or charitable aims. FLA. STAT. § 732.803(1)(a) (1985).
4. Id. § 732.803(1)(d). However, if a will containing substantially the same devise was
executed before the six month period, the devise may not be avoided. Id. § 732.803(1)(e).
5. Petitioners were Shriners' Hospital for Crippled Children and James G. Lloyd, James
C. Erdman, and Betty C. Merrick as co-personal representatives of the Estate of Lorraine E.
Romans. Zrillic, 563 So. 2d at 65-66. Two cases were consolidated for review. Id. at 65.
6. Id. at 66.
7. Id.
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. Zrillic v. Estate of Romans, 535 So. 2d 294, 294 (Fla. 5th D.C.A. 1989). Concerning
the issue of standing, petitioner cross-appealed the circuit court's ruling. Id. at 295. The district
court affirmed the circuit court, finding that respondent would be entitled to an intestate share
upon the avoidance of the residuary clause, notwithstanding her limited bequest. Id.
11. Id. at 294-95. The court also distinguished the statute from those mortmain statutes in
other states which have been held unconstitutional. Id. at 295. The court noted the savings
clause in FLA. STAT. § 732.803(1)(e) (1985), and that the avoidance of the charitable devise was
optional, at the discretion of the surviving spouse or lineal descendant. Id.

12.

FLA. STAT.

§ 732.803(l)(e) (1985).

13. See FLA. CONST. art. V, § 3(b)(3) (granting the Florida Supreme Court authority to
review decisions of the district courts which expressly declare that a state statute is valid).
14. Zrillic, 563 So. 2d at 70. The Florida Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the district
court regarding standing. Id. However, the court quashed the district court's decision that §
732.803 was constitutional. Id. at 70-71.
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ally protected property rights, 15 and that section 732.803 violated the
equal protection clauses of the Florida and United States Constitutions
because the classification established by the statute16 was neither rationally drawn nor reasonably related to a legitimate governmental

purpose.'

7

Testamentary rights historically have been considered distinct from
real property rights. 8 In 1540, the Statute of Wills established the

ability to devise real property by written will. 19 Thus, the origins of
testamentary rights are statutory.
In contrast, the tenurial land system determined the right to hold,
° and alienate
real property during life. 2 1 Under the
tenurial system, a feudal tenant held by grant of his lord, creating a
feudal pyramid.2' In exchange for title and the right to possess the
land, the tenant promised to perform services for the lord.2 Even

subinfeudate,

though title to the land was thus distributed to tenants, the feudal
system recognized that the king was the ultimate owner of all land. The concept of multiple ownership rights (land held by the king,
lords, and tenants simultaneously) in the land came from Norman law,
upon which the English feudal system was based.2 Under Norman

15. Id. at 68.
16. Id. at 70. The court determined that the statute created a class made up of those
testators who die within six months after executing a will that devised property to any of the
groups specified in FLA. STAT. § 732.803(1) (1985). Id.
17. Id.
18. W. BowE & D. PARKER, PAGE ON THE LAW OF WILLS § 3.1, at 62-63 (rev. ed. 1960)
(United States authority provides that right to make wills is considered a statutory right subject
to legislative control); Bomes, The Dead Hand: The Last Grasp?, 28 U. FLA. L. REv. 351, 360
n.77 (1976) ("[A) long line of cases . . . have consistently held that part of the residue of
sovereignty retained by the states ... is the power to determine the testamentary transfer of
a domiciliary's property and the power to determine who may be made beneficiaries." (quoting
United States v. Burnstein, 339 U.S. 87, 91-92 (1950))).
19. D. REDFEARN, WILLS AND ADMINISTRATION IN FLORIDA § 1-4, at 8 (6th ed. 1986).
Although the Statute of Wills made lands devisable by a written instrument, personalty continued
to be orally devisable for more than a century, until 1676 when the English Parliament passed
the Statute of Frauds. Id. at 8-9.
20. Subinfeudation was "[tihe system which the feudal tenants introduced of granting smaller
estates out of those which they held of their lord, to be held of themselves as inferior lords."
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1277 (5th ed. 1979).
21. See generally 1 F. POLLOCK & F. MAITLAND, THE HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 232-40
(ed. reissued 1968) (discussing basic theories and rules of tenure under English feudalism).
22. Id. at 233.
23. Id. at 235. The tenant's services to the lord may have been "onerous or nominal, noble
or humble, military or agricultural." Id.
24. Id. at 232.
25. See id. at 69-72.
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law, the tenant's ownership rights were initially precarious.26 However, as time progressed, the English common law recognized the
tenants' rights to hold and alienate the land. 27 Thus, due to the divergent paths, courts historically have viewed testamentary rights as
emanating from the legislature, and other real property rights as being
fundamental.2
The Florida Supreme Court's opinion in Taylor v. Payne- echoed
the common law doctrine that the legislature possessed broad powers
to regulate testamentary rights. 30 The plaintiff in Taylor, a religious

organization, petitioned for an order recognizing its right to the remainder of a residuary devise in the will administered by the defendant. 31 The defendant moved to strike the devise as void under the
1941 version of section 732.803.32 The Florida Supreme Court affirmed
the trial court's dismissal of the plaintiffs petition, holding that relevant statutory provisions controlled the right of testamentary disposition.- Therefore, because the legislature was the sole arbiter of tes-

tamentary rights, it could restrict, expand, or even eliminate the right
to testamentary disposition altogether.- Based upon this finding, the
charitable devise in Taylor was voidable under the statute.
While ruling that the state had broad discretion in regulating wills,
the Taylor court also recognized that the entire regulatory scheme of
testamentary disposition should be internally consistent.36 To achieve

26.

Id. at 71.

27. D. REDFEARN, supra note 19, § 1-3, at 4.
28. See W. BOWE & D. PARKER, supra note 18, § 3.1, at 62-63 (stating that testamentary
rights are regarded as neither natural nor inherent).
29. 154 Fla. 359, 17 So. 2d 615 (1944).
30. Id. at 363-64, 17 So. 2d at 617-18.
31. Id. at 361-62, 17 So. 2d at 616-17. Decedent, P.T. Richards died testate, leaving only
his widow as survivor. Id. at 361, 17 So. 2d at 616. He executed his last will and testament
within six months of his death. Id. The residuary clause contained a bequest to his widow, for
life, of all income generated by a certain contract and mortgage. Id. The will also directed that,
upon the death of his widow, the income would become payable to the trustees of the Lake
Placid Methodist Church. Id. Before administration of the estate had been completed, the widow
died. Id. at 361, 17 So. 2d at 617. Mary Emma Payne, defendant, was later appointed administratrix of the estate. Id.
32. Id. (citing FLA. STAT. § 731.19 (1941)).
33. Id. at 363, 17 So. 2d at 617, 619.
34. Id. at 363, 17 So. 2d at 617. The court noted that the homestead exemption was one
exception to this broad power of the legislature. Id. See FLA. CONST. art. X, § 4(c) (prohibiting
the devise of homestead property when a testator is survived by a spouse or minor child).
35. Taylor, 154 Fla. at 364, 17 So. 2d at 618.
36.

Id.
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this consistency, the legislature must balance a spouse's or lineal descendant's statutory right to void a charitable devise against a testator's statutory right to control property disposition.37 In weighing
these interests, the court found that the statute's purpose was to
protect testators' spouses and lineal descendants from imprudent
charitable devises made under the influence of impending death.as The
court noted that falling within the statute's parameters did not automatically void a charitable devise.3 9 Instead, the court found that
40
the devise was merely voidable by the surviving spouse or issue.
Thus, when a testator executes a will containing a charitable devise
less than six months before death, this discretion of a surviving spouse
41
or lineal descendant can override the testator's intentions.
The Florida Supreme Court reasserted the dichotomy between
testamentary and property rights in In re Estate of Blankenship."
In Blankenship, the court construed the 1957 amendment of section
732.803 which narrowed the application of the 1941 version of the
statute."1 The amendment saved a devise if the testator had executed
a will immediately before the final will and more than six months
before death, and the next-to-last will contained substantially the same
devise as the final will."
The petitioner in Blankenship sought to avoid the charitable devises in her mother's will.45 The testator had executed four wills, each
containing substantially the same charitable devise. 46 Although the
third will, the will immediately preceding the final will, was executed
less than six months before the testator's death, the first and second
47
wills were executed more than six months before the testator's death.

37. Id.
38. Id. The court questioned whether the reasoning behind such a purpose was valid. Id.
However, the court stated that the rationality of the statute is immaterial, because the subject
is totally within the power of the legislature. Id.
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. Id. at 365, 17 So. 2d at 618-19.
42. Brown v. J.L. Reed & Son (In re Estate of Blankenship), 122 So. 2d 466 (Fla. 1960).
43. Id. at 468. The 1957 amendment provided that charitable devises were not voidable if
the testator "by his will duly executed immediately next prior to such last will and more than
six months before his death, made a valid charitable bequest or devise in substantially the same
amount for the same purpose or to the same beneficiary." FLA. STAT. § 731.19 (1957), quoted
in Blankenship, 122 So. 2d at 468.
44. FLA. STAT. § 731.19 (1957).
45. Blankenship, 122 So. 2d at 467.
46. Id.
47. Id.
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The respondent argued that the court should enforce the charitable
devises because the second will, which was executed within the proper
time frame, contained substantially the same devises as the third and
fourth wills. Agreeing with the respondent's reasoning, the trial court,
affirmed by the Second District Court of Appeal, saved the devise
even though the next-to-last will had been executed less than six
months prior to the testator's death.48
In reversing the district court and voiding the devise, the Florida
Supreme Court strictly applied the requirements of the next-to-last
will exception. 49 Despite the illogical result that this strict application
of the exception produced, the court refused to substitute its judgment
for that of the legislature.- Acknowledging that testamentary rights
were wholly within the realm of legislative control, the court recognized that even results which were irrational and unjust were beyond
the scope of the court's power to remedy.5 1 However, the illogical
results of such a strict application led the Blankenship court to suggest
that the legislature amend the Florida Constitution to guarantee tes52
tamentary rights.
Although the Blankenship court proposed constitutional reform,
the state continued to possess the power to regulate and even abolish
testamentary rights. In In re Estate of Greenberg,- the plaintiff challenged section 733.304 of the Florida Statutes- as violative of the

48. Id. at 467, 468-69. The district court looked to legislative intent to construe the 1957
amendment since a literal interpretation would have led to "an unreasonable conclusion or to
a result not contemplated by the law-making body." Id. at 468.
49. Id. at 469.
50. Id.
51. Id. at 470. The court stated that every statute with inflexible requirements "is certain
to and does result in a seeming or actual injustice in some specific cases." Id. The court further
stated, however, that "this is a weakness of the statute and, again, the courts may not remedy
it." Id. (emphasis added).
52. Id. at 470-71. The court stated that a constitutional amendment should make testamentary rights subject to "reasonable regulation by the legislature so as to protect the natural
objects of the testator's bounty." Id. at 471.
53. 390 So. 2d 40, 43 (Fla. 1980).
54. FLA. STAT. § 733.304 (1977). The statute provides that:
A person who is not domiciled in the state cannot qualify as personal representative unless the person is:
(1) A legally adopted child or adoptive parent of the decedent;
(2) Related by lineal consanguinity to the decedent;
(3) A spouse or a brother, sister, uncle, aunt, nephew, or niece of the decedent; or
(4) The spouse of a person otherwise qualified under this section.
Id., quoted in Greenberg, 390 So. 2d at 42 n.2.
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equal protection clause5 of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United
States Constitution.5 Under section 733.304, a nonresident who was
unrelated to the testator could not qualify as a personal representative. 7 In addressing the constitutional challenge, the Greenberg court
ruled that the right to appoint a personal representative and other
rights relating to testamentary disposition were derived solely from
legislation.r Because the legislature created rights of testamentary
disposition, these rights were wholly within the control of the legislature. Thus, the statutory classification did not implicate any fundamen-

tal rights. 59
In addition to the fundamental rights issue, the Greenberg court
6
considered whether section 733.304 created a suspect classification. 0
A statute creating a suspect classification would be subject to strict
scrutiny.6 ' The Greenberg court found that the United States Supreme
Court only recognizes suspect classifications when the classification
involves race, nationality, or alienage.6 Because section 733.304 classified by state residency and not by one of these groups, the Greenberg
court did not apply a strict scrutiny standard of review.1
Statutory classifications which do not infringe upon any fundamental right, and which are not suspect, are subject only to minimum
scrutiny.6 Statutory classifications violate the minimum scrutiny
standard only if they are arbitrarily made and bear no reasonable
relation to a legitimate governmental interest.6 Unlike strict scrutiny,

55. U.S. CONsT. amend. XIV, § 1.
56. Greenberg, 390 So. 2d at 42. Plaintiff also challenged the statute as violative of the due
process clause of the fourteenth amendment and the privileges and immunities clause of article
IV, § 2 of the United States Constitution. Id. However, the court held that the statute violated
neither clause. Id. at 48-49.
57. Id. at 42. Although precluding nonresidents generally, the statute did allow nonresidents
who had certain familial relationships to the testator to act as representative. Id.
58. Id. at 43.
59. Id. Further, the Greenberg court observed that the United States Supreme Court has
narrowly defined the fundamental rights which, when implicated, give rise to a strict scrutiny
equal protection analysis. Id. The rights cited by the court were of a "uniquely private nature,"
such as the, rights to abortion, interstate travel, vote, free speech, and procreation. Id.
60. Id.
61. Id. at 42-43. Few statutes survive strict scrutiny review. Id. To survive strict scrutiny
review, a classification must be supported by a substantial and compelling governmental interest.
Id. at 42. Additionally, the classification must be precisely drawn. Id. See, e.g., McLaughlin v.
Florida, 379 U.S. 184 (1964) (finding a Florida statute which prohibited interracial cohabitation
invalid under a strict scrutiny review).
62. Greenberg, 390 So. 2d at 43.
63. Id.
64. Id. at 45.
65. Id. at 42.
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minimum scrutiny does not require classifications to be drawn with
mathematical precision.6 6 The Greenberg court explained that if reasonable, albeit hypothetical, justifications exist, then the classification
67
meets the minimum scrutiny standard.
In the instant case, the Florida Supreme Court departed from the
dichotomy between testamentary and property rights by holding that
article I, section 2 of the Florida Constitution implicitly protects testamentary rights.6 Therefore, the instant court rejected the well-settled precedent that the legislature was the sole arbiter of testamentary
rights. 69 Relying upon a plain reading of article I, section 2,70 the
instant court determined that the right to "acquire, possess and protect
property" 71 embraces the rights of testamentary disposition.- The instant court reasoned that a legal system which bases property rights
on express constitutional provisions requires different analysis of testamentary rights than a system rooted in tenurial ideas.- Con-

66. Id.
67. Id. at 46. The state need not attack every manifestation of a problem. Id. The equal
protection clause protects not against imperfect statutes, but against those statutes with such
little basis for classification that they are wholly arbitrary. Id.
68. Zrillic, 563 So. 2d at 66-67 (quoting FLA. CONST. art. I, § 2). This section, entitled
"Basic rights," provides:
All natural persons are equal before the law and have inalienable rights, among
which are the right to enjoy and defend life and liberty, to pursue happiness, to
be rewarded for industry, and to acquire, possess and protect property; except
that the ownership, inheritance, disposition, and possession of real property by
aliens ineligible for citizenship may be regulated or prohibited by law. No person
shall be deprived of any right because of race, religion or physical handicap.
FLA. CONST. art. I, § 2.
69. Zrillic, 563 So. 2d at 67.
70. Id. The court interpreted several words and phrases used in the constitution to determine
the extent of the constitution's grant of property rights. Id. The court found that "[iut is
commonly understood that acquire means to gain, obtain, receive, or to come into possession
or ownership of property." Id. (citation omitted). Furthermore, the court found that the meaning
of "acquire" in the constitution "'[i]ncludes taking by devise."' Id. (quoting BLACK'S LAW DicTIONARY 23 (5th ed. 1979)). The court also interpreted the meaning of "possess" and of "protect"
in the phrase "acquire, possess and protect property" to include the incidents of property
ownership, including testamentary rights. Id. See Nunnemacher v. State, 129 Wis. 190, 108
N.W. 627, 628-30 (1906) (discussing the theory that the government, rather than acting as
creator of property rights, is the protector of property rights which originate inalienably in the
people).
71. FLA. CONST. art. I, § 2.
72. Zrillic, 563 So. 2d at 67.
73. Id. at 68. The court stated that previous decisions had too often followed the feudal
system's "antiquated" reasoning for separating testamentary rights from property rights. Id.

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol43/iss1/7

8

Netzer: Florida Constitutional Law: Demise of Common Law Distinction Betw
CASE COMMENTS

sequently, the instant majority displaced the feudal concept of testamentary rights with a broader concept which regards testamentary
disposition "as a specifically expressed constitutional property right."74
Under this new property rights scheme the instant court limited
the legislature's power to creating only those regulations which are
reasonable and necessary to promote the general welfare. 7 Applying
this reasonable and necessary standard, the instant court found that
section 732.803 violated both requirements. 76 First, the statute was
unreasonable because it presumed that all spouses and lineal descendants were financially dependent on the testator or had other economic
needs'1 Second, the statute was unnecessary because other sections
of the probate code already provided for family allowances and protection against devises procured by undue influence and fraud. 8 Consequently, the instant court held that the statute restricted property
rights in violation of the Florida Constitution.79
In addition, the instant court found section 732.803 invalid under
the equal protection clauses of the United States and Florida Constitutions . 0 In defining the proper standard by which to judge the statute,
the instant court determined that to satisfy equal protection concerns,
classifications must be neither too narrow nor too broad to achieve
the desired goalA' The court found the statute to be too narrow because
it affected only a portion of charitable devises made without proper
reflection. 2 Specifically, the statute did not affect devises made to
persons who were outside the scope of the statute, yet, equally able
to influence the testator. 3 In addition, the instant court determined
that the statutory classification was too broad because it voided the
intentional devises of testators who were not unduly influenced or
whose descendants were not in financial need.s The court, citing de-

74. Id.
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. Id. at 69.
78. Id. See FLA. STAT. §§ 732.201-.215 (1989) (elective share); id. §§ 732.401-.4015 (homestead exemption); id. § 732.402 (personal property exemption); id. § 732.403 (family allowance).
The probate code also protects against undue influence, fraud, duress, and mistake. Zrilic, 563
So.. 2d at 69. See FLA. STAT. § 732.5165 (19 9) (voiding any will or part of will procured by
fraud, duress, mistake, or undue influence).
79. Zrillic, 563 So. 2d at 68.
80. Id. at 69. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1; FLA. CONST. art. I, § 2.
81. Zrillic, 563 So. 2d at 69-70.
82. Id. at 70.
83. Id.
84. Id.
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cisions from other jurisdictions to support its conclusions,8 held that
the statute was so imprecisely drawn that it bore no reasonable relationship to its intended purpose.- Therefore, the court held that the
statute could not even withstand an equal protection review under a
7
minimum scrutiny standard.
Although Justice McDonald concurred in the instant case, he disagreed with the majority's finding that article I, section 2 of the Florida
Constitution protected testamentary rights.- Justice McDonald supported the majority's result on the basis that respondent did not have
standing to avoid the charitable devise. 89 However, he stated that
there had been no societal or constitutional changes of sufficient magnitude to justify the majority's determination that the Florida Constitution protects testamentary rights.9°
Based on this finding, Justice McDonald argued that the legislature
retains the power to regulate testamentary dispositions.9 1 Therefore,
the court's role should be limited to determining whether a regulation
85. Id. See Key v. Doyle (Estate of French), 365 A.2d 621, 624 (D.C. 1976) (finding a
statute which voided all religious bequests in a will not executed within 30 days before testator's
death was too underinclusive and too overinclusive to be rationally related to the legislature's
purpose); Shriners' Hosp. for Crippled Children v. Hester, 23 Ohio St. 3d 198, 202, 492 N.E.2d
153, 156 (1986) (finding that a statute which voided charitable devises was invalid because the
statute deprived bequests to a class of beneficiaries, when the majority of such bequests were
not the product of undue influence and were not within the statute's purpose); In re Estate of
Cavill, 459 Pa. 411, 417, 329 A.2d 503, 506 (1974) (finding that a statute which automatically
voided all charitable bequests made within 30 days of testator's death lacked a "fair and substantial relation" to the legislative purpose).
86. Zrillic, 563 So. 2d at 70.
87. Id. Since the statute failed the rational basis standard, the court declined to decide
whether the statute should have been subject to a strict scrutiny analysis. Id. at 70 nn.6 & 8.
88. Id. at 71 (McDonald, J., concurring in result, dissenting in part).
89. Id. Justice McDonald stated that Mrs. Zrillic could not contest the charitable devise
since the testator's will explicitly limited her inheritance. Id. See In re Estate of Herman, 427
So. 2d 195 (Fla. 4th D.C.A. 1982) (finding a lineal descendent lacked standing to void a charitable
devise when the will did not mention the descendant and when the charitable organization's
share under a residuary devise would have shifted to the other named residuary devisee if the
devise had failed); In re Estate of Cairo, 35 A.D.2d 76, 312 N.Y.S.2d 925 (1970) (finding a lineal
descendant lacked standing to void a charitable bequest when the will specifically disinherited
the descendant), affid 29 N.Y.2d 527, 272 N.E.2d 574, 324 N.Y.S.2d 81 (1971). But cf. Frankenberg v. Broughton (In re Estate of Barker), 448 So. 2d 28 (Fla. 1st D.C.A. 1984) (finding that
beneficiaries, who were lineal descendants, each receiving a $1 bequest under a will with no
residuary clause, were eligible to take under the rules of intestate succession); Reid v. Whitfield
(In re Estate of Reid), 399 So. 2d 1032 (Fla. 1st D.C.A. 1981) (finding that a lineal descendent
who received a limited bequest of $20 per month under a will which became invalid because
the will was ineffective to dispose of the estate was entitled to take under rules of intestate
succession).
90. Zrillic, 563 So. 2d at 73 (McDonald, J., concurring in result, dissenting in part).
91. Id. at 72.
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is within the scope of that power.Y Justice McDonald concluded that
because the legislature had the power to regulate, or even prohibit
93
testamentary rights, section 732.803 was not unconstitutional.
The majority's decision departed from the common law dichotomy
which distinguished between property rights held during life and tes-

tamentary rights.9 By holding that testamentary rights are fundamental and protected under the Florida Constitution, 95 the instant decision
overruled Taylor, Blankenship, and Greenberg.9 Thus, in augmenting

Florida constitutional property rights, the instant case limited the
common law dichotomy between property rights held during life and

testamentary rights.
While it is clear that the instant court has expanded Florida's

constitutional property rights,9 it is unclear how far the Florida courts
will go in protecting such rights. Under the instant court's decision,
any law regulating testamentary rights must be reasonable and necessary to promote the general welfare.9 If the regulation fails this

threshold test, further analysis is moot.9 However, if a regulation
creates a classification which passes the threshold reasonable and
necessary analysis, it is still subject to equal protection review. 1°°

As the Greenberg court pointed out, strict scrutiny is the proper
standard for equal protection review only when the classification im-

However, the United
plicates a suspect group or a fundamental right. 10,
1
States Supreme Court has recognized few classifications as suspect. '2

92. Id.
93. Id.
94. See supra notes 18-28 and accompanying text.
95. Zrillic, 563 So. 2d at 67-68; see also supra notes 68-74 and accompanying text.
96. Zrillic, 563 So. 2d at 70. By expressly overruling Taylor, 154 Fla. at 359, 17 So. 2d
at 615, the instant court implicitly overruled Blankenship, 122 So. 2d at 466 and Greenberg,
390 So. 2d at 40. Id.
97. See Greenberg, 390 So. 2d at 43 (finding that "[in fact, the right to make a will and
other matters relating thereto such as designation of a personal representative are rights created
by statute."); Blankenship, 122 So. 2d at 469 (holding that "[tlhe right [to testamentary disposition] is a creature of statute, subject at all times to prohibition, regulation, and control by
the legislature."); Taylor, 154 Fla. at 363, 17 So. 2d at 617 (stating that 'the right of testamentary
disposition of property does not emanate from the organic law, as contended by counsel, but is
a creature of the law derived solely from statute without constitutional limitation").
98. Zrillic, 563 So. 2d at 68.
99. See id. at 70 n.6. In the instant case, § 732.803 failed the threshold test. Id. at 68.
Consequently, the equal protection analysis of the statute is not necessary to determine the
outcome of the case. See id. at 70 n.6.
100. Id. at 69-70; see also Greenberg, 390 So. 2d at 42-46 (applying the equal protection
analysis to § 733.304 of the Florida Statutes (1977)).
101. Greenberg, 390 So. 2d at 42-43.
102. Id. at 43 (mentioning the suspect classes of race, nationality, and alienage); see supra
text accompanying note 62.
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Furthermore, the instant court declined to address whether testamentary rights are fundamental for equal protection purposes. '1 3 Consequently, if a testamentary regulation satisfies the minimum scrutiny
standard, it is still unclear whether the court will apply a higher
standard of review under an ensuing equal protection analysis. Such
uncertainty regarding the constitutional standard applicable to testamentary regulation could make it difficult for the practitioner to
determine how best to protect a testator's intentions or the interests
of an actual or prospective beneficiary.
Practitioners also should be aware that the instant court's application of the minimum scrutiny standard deviated from the court's previous application of the standard to a testamentary right.0° In Greenberg, the court suggested that the minimum scrutiny standard was
satisfied if any facts could be imagined to justify the classification.05
However, the instant court found that section 732.803 failed a minimum
scrutiny analysis because the statute was not drawn precisely. -° The
instant court's requirement of a precise classification under a minimum
scrutiny standard is at odds with the Greenberg court's broad test.
The instant court's finding that the Florida Constitution protects testamentary rights may explain the disparity between the equal protection analysis of Greenberg and the anlysis in the instant case.
Both the majority and the dissent in the instant case overlooked
other possible ramifications of the majority's holding. The rules of
intestate succession control the disposition of property when a will
specifically limits a beneficiary's bequest and fails to dispose of the
entire estate. 10 7 Thus, a lineal descendant could take property under
the intestate succession statutes, despite the testator's intent to limit
the descendant's inheritance.'08 Because the instant case held that the

103. See Zrillic, 563 So. 2d at 70 n.6. (finding that "[a]lthough the express constitutional
property right at issue in the instant case may well qualify for application of a more stringent
test, we need not address that issue because ... section 732.803 fails to satisfy even the rational
basis test.").
104. See Greenberg, 390 So. 2d at 42-46 (applying the minimum scrutiny analysis to a statute
denying testator's right to appoint a nonresident as personal representative).
105. Id. at 46.
106. Zrillic, 563 So. 2d at 70. The court found that "[s]uch underinclusive or overinclusive
classifications fail to meet even the minimal standards of the rational basis test." Id.
107. See FLA. STAT. §§ 732.101-.111 (1989) (stating that any part of an estate not effectively
disposed of by will passes by intestate succession).
108. See Barker, 448 So. 2d at 28 (holding that lineal descendants who received a $1 bequest
under a will with no residuary clause were eligible to take under the rules of intestate succession);
Reid, 399 So. 2d at 1032 (holding that a lineal descendant who received a bequest of $20 per
month under an invalid will was entitled to take under the rules of intestate succession). See
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Florida Constitution protects testamentary rights, increased litigation
concerning intestate distributions which conflict with testator intent
may result.
The instant court's decision also could threaten a surviving spouse's
right to an elective share. 1°9 Currently, a surviving spouse has a statutory right to thirty percent of the net value of a deceased spouse's
assets which are subject to administration.110 However, a surviving
spouse seeking a maximum inheritance will claim the elective share
only when a testator devises less than thirty percent of the estate's
net value to the spouse."', Consequently, the exercise of a right of
election usually would occur only when the election would be contrary
to the testator's intent. The instant case establishes a testator's con112
stitutional right to control the disposition of the testator's estate.
Therefore, based on the instant case a future court may hold that the
right to an elective share is not sufficiently reasonable and necessary 3
to justify overriding the testator's intent.
The instant court has created constitutional rights where none
existed before." 4 By shifting the locus of power over testamentary
dispositions from the legislature to constitutional protection and judicial review, the instant court has introduced uncertainties into probite
law. Although it is clear that testamentary regulations will be subject
to a greater level of scrutiny in the future, the exact level of equal
protection scrutiny that the court will apply remains unclear. This
lack of clarity produces a variety of issues for practitioners. Chiefly,
the instant decision raises questions regarding how practitioners can
best protect the interests of testators and beneficiaries. Resolving
these questions likely will result in increased litigation and a concomitant strain on scarce judicial resources.
Evin Netzer
also FLA. STAT. §§ 732.101-.111 (1989) (intestate rules are neutral as to considering the intent
of the testator).
109. See FLA. STAT. §§ 732.201-.215 (1989) (providing a surviving spouse with the right
to an elective share).
110. See id. §§ 732.201, .207 (allowing a surviving spouse to elect a 30% share of the net
value of the decedent's estate subject to administration).
111. See id. § 732.211 (providing that after payment of an elective share, the remaining
assets of the estate "shall be distributed as though the surviving spouse had predeceased" the
testator). Accordingly, a surviving spouse who was devised 50% of the testator's net estate
only would receive a 30% share if the spouse exercised a right of election. Therefore, a rational
spouse would exercise the right only if the spouse's bequest was less than 30% of the estate's
assets.
112. See Zrillic, 563 So. 2d at 67-68; see also supra notes 68-74 and accompanying text.
113. See Zrilic, 563 So. 2d at 68; see supra text accompanying note 75.
114. See Zrillic, 563 So. 2d at 67-68; see supra notes 68-74 and accompanying text.
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